A Typology of Mediation in Homer[1]

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The tale of *Iliad* 1 proceeds along a linear course punctuated by crises at which alternative paths come into sight; choices are made, as if at crossroads, and then the narrative continues along the path ostensibly determined by those choices. What more specifically structures its progress is a rhythm of Crisis, Mediation, and Response, in which the latter event rarely marks a true narrative closure, but instead only opens out on further crises, paths that fork and fork again. A priest's appeal for restitution of his daughter is rejected by a king, and plague ensues. The mediation of a prophet leads on the one hand to approval and the propitiation of offended deity, but on the other to strife between warrior and king. An elder's attempt to mediate their conflict (in which the successful intercession of a goddess is itself embedded) fails to win acceptance, and the warrior withdraws from society. His crisis triggers a second divine intervention in the form of an appeal to the highest god, whose acquiescence on the one hand subordinates all the subsequent narrative to the guidance of a Plan, at the same time as it generates conflict with yet another deity. The book closes with successful mediation of their strife, with everything ostensibly right in heaven, though impending disaster among mortals.

This study attempts to disengage the event of Mediation from its central place in this narrative course in order to map its contours better. Its point of departure—no more or less arbitrary than any beginning—is a formulaic line. The address-formula ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν [He in kind intention toward all stood forth and addressed them] (9X, 6X) introduces the intercessory speeches of

Kalkhas (73) and Nestor (253) in *Iliad* 1; despite (and because of) their failure, their influence on the progress and direction of the ensuing narrative is critical.[2] The formula not only implicitly adverts to functional parallels between them, but also situates both within a well-defined group of similar figures in Homer. A clear typology of the Mediator emerges from examination of the characters with whom the formula is associated and the contextual parameters in which it is used.

1: *Ethos*

While the formula appears nine times without variation in the *Iliad* (1.73;253, 2.78;283, 7.326;367, 9.95, 15.285, 18.253) and six times in the *Odyssey* (2.160;228, 7.158, 16.399, 24.53;453), in the latter poem it also accommodates a small number of allomorphs. The shape most frequently taken follows the "he addressed him with qualification" pattern analyzed by M. Edwards,[3] which in place of the hemistich #ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων admits two instances (*Od.* 2.24, 24.425) of #τοῦ ὅ γε δάκρυ χέων [shedding a tear for his sake] in lines widely separated but thematically quite close. In each case, the qualifying phrase is used with reference to an aged father's grief in remembrance of his deceased son—Aigyptios for Antiphos in the first Ithakan Assembly (*Od.* 2), Eupeithes for Antinoos at the beginning of the informal assembly of Ithakans in Book 24—and in the second of these two passages the #τοῦ ὅ γε δάκρυ χέων hemistich is repeated at the close of the speech that it was used to introduce (*Od.* 24.438). This apparent restriction of the formula to instances of goodwill and sorrow displayed by elderly figures is itself an interesting one; its significance will be explored later. The other cases of the line with ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν# filling the second hemistich take the form of #τοῖσιν δ᾽ - υ υ -, with the name of the speaker (Alkinoos 3X, Amphinomos 3X, Antinoos 1X) substituting for the qualifying /participle/ or /noun + participle/ in the space between the A1 and B1 caesura.

Speeches introduced by ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν show similar patterning. The line in each case serves to mark the following speaker as an authority-figure whose advice implicitly deserves the attention and approval of his audience. Respect accrues to the

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[2] The text of Homer used in this study is that of the standard Oxford edition. English translations of important lines and phrases (meant more as an aid to the Greekless than as definitive renderings) are those of Lattimore 1961 and 1965, with occasional (and slight) adaptation.

[3] Edwards 1970:10-12. See also the related studies by the same author in the list of references.

speaker in most instances because of his great age; fully two-thirds (10 of 15X) of all uses of the formula predicate it of old men. This is obviously the case with Nestor himself (*Il.* 1.253, 2.78, 7.326, 9.95; *Od.* 24.53), whose longevity forms the core of his ethical type, and with whom the whole-line formula is indeed most often (5X = 33%) used.[4] But it applies equally to other elders as well: Priam (*Il.* 7.367), Halitherses (*Od.* 2.160, 4.453), Mentor (*Od.* 2.228), and the Phaiakian Ekheneos (*Od.* 7.153). The type of the Elder in fact comes to expression by recourse to a small complex of idioms in these ten instances, which in addition to the intentional markers of Goodwill (or Sorrow) also make reference to the Elder's circumspection and the temporal scope of his knowledge. Thus Halitherses (*Od.* 2.188), Ekheneos (*Od.* 7.157), and Nestor (*Od.* 24.51) are all qualified by the closing hemistich παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς# [knowing many ancient things], which (though based on the extensive endline formula - υ υ εἰδώς#) appears nowhere else in either poem. Moreover, the formula for circumspection, ὁ γὰρ οἶος ὅρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω# [who alone looked both ahead and behind], closing the line after a patronymic (Πανθοΐδης / Μαστορίδης) that extends as far as the A2 caesura, is found only with reference to Halitherses (*Od.* 24.452) and the Trojan Poulydamas (*Il.* 18.250)—who despite his youth embodies many of the features traditionally associated with advanced age. An enjambed line with the same formula as far as the B2 caesura also characterizes Halitherses in *Od.* 2.158-59: Μαστορίδης ὁ γὰρ οἶος ὁμιλικίην ἐκέκαστο / ὄρνιθας γνῶναι [Mastor's son, for he alone of his generation | knew the meaning of birdflight]. An allomorph of the line with πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω# after the C2 caesura—but admitting a different first hemistich and the substitution of ἅμα for ὅρα—in one instance (*Il.* 1.343) denies precisely this capacity to Agamemnon (οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω [and has not wit enough to look ahead and behind]), and in the other (with enjambement of the verb) serves to represent Priam as an exemplary elder by contrast with the impetuousness of young men (*Il.* 3.108-10):

§1   αἰεὶ δ᾽ ὁπλοτέρων ἀνδρῶν φρέν(ες ἠερέθονται·
       οἷς δ᾽ ὁ γέρων μετέῃσιν, ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω
       λεύσσει, ὅπως ὄχ᾽ ἄριστα μετ᾽ ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται.

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[4] The bibliography on the figure of Nestor, apart from attempts to associate him with the archaeology of Pylos, is relatively sparse. Except for Vester 1956, most studies concentrate on individual scenes or speeches. See, e.g., Cantieni 1942, Davies 1986, Lang 1983, Pedrick 1983, Segal 1971, and occasional remarks in Frame 1978 (esp. 81-115) and Whitman 1958.

Always it is, that the hearts in the younger men are frivolous,
but when an elder man is among them, he looks behind him
and in front, so that all comes out far better for both sides.

Specific details of this characterization will concern us shortly. The remaining five instances of the whole-line formula ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν, though predicated of young or middle-aged men, only serve all the more to confirm the priority of the Elder as intercessory figure. We have already noted the responsion between Halitherses and Poulydamas in the shared formula: /Patronymic/ + ὁ γὰρ οἶος ὅρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω. Though coeval with Hektor and in fact the hero's Double,[5] Poulydamas in his capacity for circumspection plays expressly the role of older man in their confrontation on the Trojan plain. He approaches the paradigm of the Elder more closely than do any of the other younger men (Odysseus, Thoas, Amphimonos) connected with the address-formula, for the contrast between rhetorical and military prowess in whose terms he is opposed to Hektor (*Il.* 18.252) is precisely what traditionally distinguishes old men from young ones. This much is clear from Nestor's own qualification of his praise for Diomedes in *Iliad* 9.53f.;56-59:

§2   Τυδεΐδη, περὶ μὲν πολέμῳ, ἔνι κάρτερός ἐσσι
        καὶ βουλῇ μετὰ πάντας ὁμήλικας ἔπλευ ἄριστος
        . . .
              . . .ἀτὰρ οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων.
        ἦ μὲν καὶ νέος ἐσσί, ἐμὸς δέ κε καὶ πάϊς εἴης
        ὁπλότατος γενεῆφιν· ἀτὰρ πεπνυμένα βάζεις
        Ἀργείων βασιλῆς, ἐπεὶ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες.

        Son of Tydeus, beyond others you are strong in battle,
        and in counsel also are noblest among all men of your own age.
        . . .
              . . .Yet you have not made complete your argument,
        since you are a young man still and could even be my own son
        and my youngest born of all; yet still you argue in wisdom
        with the Argive kings, for all you have spoken was spoken fairly.

The same sentiment is expressed at, e.g., *Odyssey* 3.124-25 and 4.204-5.

Circumspection, linked with command of persuasive rhetoric, is likewise associated with the other young men to whom the formula ascribes goodwill. Thus Odysseus (no untried youth but hardly a greybeard)

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[5] On Patroklos as Double, see Redfield 1975:143, Willcock 1976 (at 11.57-60).

addresses the Akhaian Assembly after his rebuke of Thersites with scepter in hand—#ἔστη σκῆπτρον ἔχων [he stood holding the sceptre] (whose closest parallel is the hemistich #σκῆπτρον ἔχων ἑστήκει used at *Il*. 18.557 to describe the paradigmatic King depicted on the Shield)—while beside him Athene in the likeness of a herald enjoins silence on the crowd (*Il*. 2.279-83). Here above all else the intersection of Mediator with Counselor is evident. The link becomes clearer in the case of the Aitolian Thoas (*Il*. 15.281-85). Along with his prowess as a fighter (ἐπιστάμενος μὲν ἄκοντι | ἐσθλὸς δ᾽ ἐν σταδίῃ [skilled in the spear's throw | and brave in close fight]), his skills in debate are remarkable for one so young: ἀγορῇ δέ ἑ παῦροι Ἀχαιῶν / νίκων, ὁππότε κοῦροι ἐρίσσειαν περὶ μῦθον [In assembly few of the Akhaians | when the young men contended in debate could outdo him]. The status Thoas enjoys is in fact marked in an earlier passage (*Il*. 13.215-18) in which Poseidon assumes his voice—#εἰσάμενος φθογγήν (cf. the allomorph #εἴσατο δὲ φθογγήν used of Iris' impersonation of Polites at *Il*. 2.791)—to address Idomeneus. Similar features characterize Amphinomos in the *Odyssey* (16.394-99). His control of speech more than that of any other suitor pleased Penelope, since his intentions were the best: μάλιστα δὲ Πηνελοπείη / ἥνδανε μύθοισι, φρεσὶ γὰρ κέχρητ᾽ ἀγαθῆσιν [and he pleased Penelope | more than the others in talk, for he had good sense and discretion]. The end-line formula φρεσὶ γὰρ κέχρητ᾽ ἀγαθῆσιν# is elsewhere used only of Klytaimestra prior to her seduction (*Od*. 3.266) and of Eumaios (*Od*. 14.421), to describe his reverence for the gods.

The association of age with persuasive rhetoric runs throughout the representation of the elders whose words the ὅ σφιν ἐΰφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν formula introduces. Nestor is not only one of the major proponents of practical intelligence (μῆτις) in the *Iliad* (cf. 7.324-25 = 9.93-94, 23.311-18), but also and chiefly the paradigm of the orator, the λιγὺς ἀγορητής "from whose tongue the voice flowed sweeter than honey" (*Il*. 1.251). The hemistich λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής# [lucid speaker of Pylos], filling the line after the B2 caesura, is repeated once elsewhere (*Il*. 4.293), when Nestor calls his troops to order. Its allomorph, λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής [although a lucid speaker], appears on three occasions (*Il*. 2.246, 19.82; *Od*. 20.274); here the sense is concessive, and its contrast with the formula used of Nestor is an interesting one. The allomorphic versions all occur in speech, not diegesis, and advert to a speaker's failure to command the respect or attention of his audience. In *Iliad* 19, an apologetic Agamemnon acknowledges the difficulty faced by even the best orator when confronted by an unruly crowd. In the *Odyssey* passage, its tone is sarcastic: Antinoos taunts Telemakhos and threatens to shut his mouth permanently, lucid

speaker that he is. Equally biting is its use by Odysseus in *Iliad* 2 to refer to Thersites—whose physical ugliness (212-20) is an index of even more repellent social deformities, and whose role in the narrative is precisely the opposite of Nestor's. Elsewhere, forms of the adjective λιγύς (alone or compounded) skew their reference between the natural and human worlds, from the "shrillness" of birdsong (2X), whip (1X), and wind (6X) to the keening of mourners (5X), the lure of Seirenes (1X), the lyre's sweet piercing sound (7X), and the lucid quality of the herald's voice (6X).

In this context, it is in fact worth a slight digression from the *ethos* of the Mediator to note the intersection of the traits of rhetorical prowess, advanced age, and goodwill in the related figure of the herald (κῆρυξ). Of the 88 instances of the noun in its various inflections, only one-fifth (18X) exhibit adjectival or clausal modification. This ranges from simple epithets (most of which survive as *hapax legomena*) such as λιγυφθόγγοισι (5X), ἀγαυοί# (2X), ἀστυβοώτην#(1C), ἠπύτα (1X), and ἠεροφώνων# (1X), to clauses like Διὸς ἄγγελοι ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν# [messengers of gods and men] (2X) or οἳ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασιν# [who serve the *demos*] (1X). The largest group of modifiers (5X)—to which must be added an additional five instances (for a total of 10 of 23X = 43%) in which the common noun is replaced by the name of the herald—clusters around the trait of "sagacity" or "prudence" that comes to expression uniquely in formulas built upon the ubiquitous participle πεπνυμεν-:

§3	A	. . . πεπνυμένω ἄμφω#	(2X)
	B	. . . πεπνύμενα εἰδώς#	(4X, of Medon)
	C	. . . πεπνύμενα μήδεα εἰδώς#	(2X)
	D	. . . φίλα φρεσὶ μήδεα εἰδώς#	(1X)
and cf.	E	. . . πυκινὰ φρεσὶ μήδε᾽ ἔχοντες#	(2X)

The last example (E) is used on both occasions of Priam and his aged herald, and should be compared with its allomorph ἔστι δέ μοι γρῆϋς πυκινὰ φρεσὶ μήδε᾽ ἔχουσα [I have one old woman, whose thoughts are prudent] (*Od*. 19.353), spoken with reference to the Nurse, Eurykleia. The "wisdom" or "compactness of mind" of the herald is in fact a trait most often associated with maturity—cf. the mid-line formula πυκινὸν ἔπος used only with Priam (*Il*. 7.375), Nestor (*Il*. 11.787), and Zeus (*Il*. 24.74), once (*Il*. 24.744) of Hektor by Andromakhe. The advanced age of the herald—or of the best kind of herald—is an abiding characteristic. For his mission to Akhilleus in *Iliad* 24, Priam chooses Idaios as his charioteer. The herald is twice described (*Il*. 24.282;674), along with Priam, by the E-

formula, and is himself earlier associated with both A (*Il.* 7.276) and C (*Il.* 7.278). His age is emphasized in the virtually identical lines #κῆρυξ τίς οἱ ἕποιτο γεραίτερος. . . [Let one elder herald attend him] (*Il.* 24.149;178), and also in Hermes' comment οὔτ' αὐτὸς νέος ἐσσί, γέρων δέ τοι οὗτος ὀπηδεῖ [You are not young yourself, and he who attends you is aged] later in the same book (368).

The disguised Odysseus describes the herald Eurybates (in a passage striking for its *hapax legomena*, which contribute to the credibility of the Beggar's tale) as κῆρυξ ὀλίγον προγενέστερος αὐτοῦ [a herald, a little older than he was] (*Od.* 19.244). Compare this with the restriction of this adjective (3X, 4X) elsewhere to description of intercessory figures such as Nestor (*Il.* 2.555, 9.161) and the Phaiakian Ekheneos (*Od.* 7.156, [11.342]). The Eurybates passage (*Od.* 19.248) further associates age with sound-mindedness (οἱ φρεσὶ ἄρτια ᾔδη# [his thoughts were sensible]), in a formula directly echoed in the phrase φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν# used by Alkinoos of the sensible man (*Od.* 8.240). Related in turn (and to come full circle) is πεπνυμένα βάζεις# in Menelaos' compliment to Nestor's son Peisistratos (*Od.* 4.204-6)—

§4   ὦ φίλ', ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅς ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνὴρ
         εἴποι καὶ ῥέξειε, καὶ ὃς προγενέστερος εἴη·
         τοίου γὰρ καὶ πατρός, ὃ καὶ πεπνυμένα βάζεις

         Friend, since you have said all that a man who is thoughtful
         could say or do, even one who was older than you are—
         why, this is the way your father is, so you too speak thoughtfully.

—as well as Nestor's to Diomedes (πεπνυμένα βάζεις#) in the lines quoted earlier (*Il.* 9.58; see §2). To these may finally be added the description of Periphas, herald of Ankhises, whom Apollo impersonates to encourage the terrified Aineias in a passage that succinctly binds the κῆρυξ in an associational web of age, paternity, and goodwill (*Il.* 17.322-25):

§5   . . .ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Ἀπόλλων
         Αἰνείαν ὄτρυνε, δέμας Περίφαντι ἐοικώς,
         κήρυκι Ἠπυτίδῃ, ὅς οἱ παρὰ πατρὶ γέροντι
         κηρύσσων γήρασκε, φίλα φρεσὶ μήδεα εἰδώς.

                    . . .had not Apollo in person
         stirred on Aineias; he had assumed the form of the herald
         Periphas, Epytos' son, growing old in his herald's office
         by his aged father, and a man whose thoughts were of kindness.

        To return to the characterization of intercessors in the strict sense of the term—i.e. as qualified contextually by the address-formula ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν—we note the description of Priam as θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος# [equal of the gods in counsel] (*Il.* 7.365), in a formula appearing elsewhere only with reference to Patroklos (*Il.* 17.477; *Od.* 3.110) and Nestor's father Neleus (*Od.* 3.409). The preeminence Halitherses enjoys in reading birdflight is matched by his ability to put omens into words (*Od.* 2.159: καὶ ἐναίσιμα μυθήσασθαι#). Although the figure of Mentor is not linked with formulas shared by the other elders, his association with persuasion (πειθώ) is an abiding one; this trait will occupy our attention when we come to examine the typical nature of responses to the speech of intercessory figures. Athene's frequent impersonation of Mentor at critical moments in the *Odyssey* (Books 2, 3, 22, 24) also emphasizes his prominence as a counselor. The aged Ekheneos (*Od.* 7.155-58), finally, "oldest of the Phaiakians" (ὃς δὴ Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν προγενέστερος ἦεν), is likewise marked by his "possession" of speech (#καὶ μύθοισι κέκαστο).

        One last subgroup of Mediators associated with the whole-line formula remains to be considered. In addition to experience and soundness of mind, prophetic insight can also provide the basis for authoritative speech and thus merit attention and respect. Further, though Mediation most often occurs between human antagonists, the seer's hermeneutic position at the boundary between the human world and that of divinity marks him especially for an intercessory role. In this capacity Kalkhas of course figures prominently in the opening of the *Iliad* (cf. also *Il.* 2.299-330); and his speech is prefaced by the first instance in the poem of the formulaic statement of Goodwill (*Il.* 1.73). It is in fact tempting to locate the point of intersection between Prophet and Elder—with the exception of Theoklymenos in the *Odyssey* and Kalkhas here, all Homeric prophets are old men—in we have called "circumspection," the trait embodied in the formulaic ὅρα {ἅμα} πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω {ἰλεύσσει}. The precise sense of this phrase is not so easy to determine. Whereas all nine of the occurrences of πρόσσω alone have a clearly spatial meaning, the instances (49X) of ὀπίσσω unevenly skew it between spatial (17X = 35%) and temporal (32X = 65%) reference. These figures of course have no necessary bearing on the sense of the conjunction of the two in πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω#, and the best that can be said may well be that the phrase simultaneously intends a "look" in both spatial and temporal directions that the term "circumspection" only inadequately renders. The ability "to see both ahead and behind" in the mortal world finds its counterpart in the far broader (and explicitly) temporal sweep of prophetic vision. Kalkhas alone in Homer is given the descriptive verse (*Il.* 1.70) ὃς

ἤδη τά τ'ἐόντα τά τ'ἐσσόμενα πρό τ'ἐόντα [who knew all things that were, the things to come and the things past], though the essential core of the formula (after the A2 caesura) recurs in Hesiod (*Th*. 38; cf. *Th*. 32). The prophet's claim to immediate (visual) access to events that both precede and postdate his own temporal horizon—an access that thanks to the Muses (cf. *Il*. 2.485: ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε, πάρεστέ τε, ἴστέ τε πάντα [For you are goddesses, you are present, and you know all things]) the poet himself can enjoy—will occupy our attention in what follows.

A synopsis is in order here. It will perforce be provisional and tentative. One insight that emerges clearly from the study of clustered formulas at all levels of their manifestation (colon, line, generic scene) is the interdependence of the units involved. The traits associated with Mediation seem to cross and overlap with a variety of figures: Old Man, Young Man, Nurse, Double, Prophet, and Herald. What must be especially resisted at this point is the temptation to grant priority to the *ethos* of a fictional character or character-type (and so to what may prove to be the fiction of autonomous agency itself) over the context in which that agency comes to expression—a temptation only strengthened by habits of reading and interpretation, to say nothing for the moment of deeper presuppositions these habits imply. For reasons that only the conclusion of this study can hope to justify or even to articulate fully, the initial choice to present a typology of Mediation in Homer by splitting up the unity of the phenomenon into an *ethos* and its contextual parameters—themselves in turn split further into parameters of situation and response—risks misrepresenting the true nature of the issue. Granted this proviso, undoubtedly a cryptic one at this point, we can proceed with a summary account of traits that constitute the *ethos* of the Mediator.

Several have been isolated. The most prominent of these, given our choice of the formula ὅ σφιν ἐΰφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καί μετέειπεν as a point of departure, bears on the quality of his intentions. The Mediator is a kindly figure, fair-minded (ἐΰφρονέων // φρεσί γάρ κέχρητ' ἀγαθῇσιν# // φίλα φρεσί μήδεα εἰδώς#, etc.), and thus better capable of grasping a given situation without personal bias. Advanced age is privileged, but by reason of features that can also appear (precociously) in the young. Such features include first and foremost the trait we have inadequately rendered as "circumspection"—a trait defined at least in major part in terms of temporal range (ὅρα {ἅμα} πρόσσω καί ὀπίσσω {ἰλεύσσει} // ὃς ἤδη τά τ'ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ'ἐόντα). Thanks to the experiential breadth his age has won for him (παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς#), to prophetic gifts or to (a still vaguely defined) "soundness of mind" ({πεπνυμένα} μήδεα εἰδώς# // πυκινά φρεσί μήδε' ἔχοντες#), the Mediator

enjoys the ability to "see both before and after" the present (and always critical) situation. Analysis of the actual content of intercessory speeches would show that this "sight" generally comprehends either (1) the generic status of the present situation (and thus issues in speeches whose rhetorical mode is that of the parable or paradigm);[6] (2) its specific etiology (when the Mediator is also a Prophet), and so too the proper response it enjoins along with the consequences of failure to respond properly; or else (3) a firm sense of what is "right and fitting" to do.

At this point, and in terms of the broader temporal range that advanced age lends the Mediator, it may also be fitting to speak to the variation #του ὅ γε δάκρυ χέων [shedding a tear for his sake] in two instances of the overall address-formula. In addition to kindly intentions, a specific kind of grief also marks the speech of elderly figures. The responsion between Aigyptios and Eupeithes, respectively at the beginning and the end of the *Odyssey*, is a rich one that the present study can explore only superficially. The fact that the formula in each case thematizes memory is itself important, not only in view of the temporal breadth of intercessory figures, but also in terms of the objectivity this breadth permits. What indeed relates Aigyptios and Eupeithes along the axis of the formulaic line they share is their antithetical responses to the same deep personal sorrow. Both have lost sons, and in both cases Odysseus himself is to some degree (more or less directly) to blame. Their responses could not differ more, however. Aigyptios subordinates his grief to the welfare of the community at large, which hinges on the return of its absent King: no assembly has met on Ithaka since Odysseus left for Troy, he says; may Zeus prosper the fortunes of whoever has called them together now (*Od*. 2.25-34). This is a marked expression of community, of piety, of resignation to the will of Zeus despite intimate loss, in a story in which the issues of reverence and justice are paramount. Eupeithes' appeal in Book 24 exhibits precisely the opposite attitude. For him the (justified) revenge wrought on the suitors only demands another round in a socially destructive cycle of vendetta. Personal motives of grief and shame override his concerns for justice and communal integrity (*Od*. 24.425-38). Absorbed by sorrow that touches him no less deeply than does the sorrow of Aigyptios—and despite even the index of divine sanction for Odysseus' revenge, to which Medon's speech (439-49) adverts—Eupeithes is incapable of the kind of acquiescence that Aigyptios shows. Precisely because of this he suffers the last death in the *Odyssey*— significantly, at the hands of a father who has also tasted the grief of an absent son.

There remains the association with persuasive rhetoric, by which all intercessory figures are without exception characterized. The absence of explicit reference to command of speech in the single case of Kalkhas (*Il*.

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[6] See Lohmann 1970:183-209, Pedrick 1983.

1.68-73) is not a true counterexample. Prophets have little need of eloquence, since (for cultural reasons that the narrative always endorses) their mantic status alone suffices to affirm the authority of what they have to say, to lend them sight "both before and after," and so to command obedience. Persuasion (πειθώ) in particular is a concept that exposes the distortion caused by our choice to examine the typology of Mediation under three separate headings, since above all other concepts it points up the co-implication of *ethos* and response. The characterization of Mediators as persuasive is in some sense nothing more than a narrative prolepsis of the approval their advice wins—and this approval in turn is in a way already predisposed by just that proleptic characterization. Persuasiveness is essentially a perlocutionary attribute: the Active πείθειν [to persuade] necessarily implies the verb in its Middle Voice: πείθεσθαι [to obey]. We will see that this much is clear and perhaps even clearest in cases in which the Mediator's advice is in fact rejected.

2: *Situation*

Turning now from the kinds of character involved in the typology of Mediation to their contextual parameters, we note fundamental similarities among the situations in which intercessory figures appear. In by far the majority of cases (12 of 15X = 80%), the context in which the ὅ σφιν ἐΰφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν formula is used is that of Debate, whether during an official Assembly (*Il.* 1.73;253, 2.78;283, 7.367, 9.95; *Od.* 2.160;228) or else on any occasion in which a dispute arises without the trappings of a formal council (*Il.* 7.326, 18.253; *Od.* 16.399, 24.453). In all these instances the situation is one in which events have for one reason or another reached a critical impasse: (S1) the plague sent by Apollo (*Il.* 1), (S2) the confrontation of Akhilleus and Agamemnon (*Il.* 1), (S3) Agamemnon's "false" dream (*Il.* 2), (S4) the Assembly to decide the issue of retreat or perseverance at Troy (*Il.* 2), (S5) plans for the burial of warriors and the construction of the defensive wall (*Il.* 7), (S6) the Trojan Assembly (*Il.* 7), (S7) the Embassy to Akhilleus (*Il.* 9), (S8) the debate between Poulydamas and Hektor in the Trojan encampment on the plain (*Il.* 18), (S9-S10) the first Ithakan Assembly (*Od.* 2), (S11) the suitors' plot to kill Telemakhos (*Od.* 16), (S12) the planned vengeance of the Ithakans for Odysseus' slaughter of their sons (*Od.* 24). These contexts admit a variety of scenic structures. The Mediator's speech can be prompted by the turn of events themselves (S1, S3, S5, S8, S9), in which case it is most often the first speech in the series (S5, S8, S9) or else is preceded by a formal request for intercession (S1, S3). Alternately, it may come as the third element in the Statement-Counterstatement-Reconciliation

(A-B-C) pattern studied by Lohmann in some Homeric Assembly scenes (S2, S4, S6, S7, S10, S11, S12).[7]

In four instances of the address-formula ὅ σφιν ἐΰφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν in Assemblies (S1, S3, S6, S10), the Mediator is additionally marked by the presence of a formula that introduces a change of speaker: Ἤτοι ὅ γ᾽ ὣς εἰπὼν κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετο· τοῖσι δ᾽ ἀνέστη [He spoke thus and sat down again, and among them stood up] (Il. 1.68, 7.365). This whole-line formula appears only six times (5X, 1X) in the poems, accounting for the largest share (32%) of the total number (19X) of instances of the colon υ υ ἕζετο between the B1 and C2 caesuras, with ἕζετο in this position in turn comprising nearly 60% (19 of 32X) of all occurrences of this form of the verb (initial #ἕζετο = 34%). In one case (S2) a variation is used that allows for expanded description of the actions of the previous speaker, but nonetheless preserves the essential elements "/X spoke/ - /X sat/ - /Y stood up among them/" (Il. 1.245-48):

§6   Ὣς φάτο Πηλεΐδης, ποτὶ δὲ σκῆπτρον βάλε γαίη
          χρυσείοις ἥλοισι πεπαρμένον, ἕζετο δ᾽ αὐτός·
          Ἀτρεΐδης δ᾽ ἑτέρωθεν ἐμήνιε· τοῖσι δὲ Νέστωρ
          ἡδυεπὴς ἀνόρουσε. . .

          Thus spoke Peleus' son, and dashed to the ground the sceptre
          studded with golden nails, and sat down again. But Atreides
          raged still on the other side, and between them Nestor
          the fair-spoken rose up. . .

In addition to the ubiquitous #Ὣς φάτο + /patronymic/, allomorphs of elements in these lines include initial #- υ υ - {δ'} ἀνόρουσε (8 of 18X) completed by #ἐς δίφρον (3X) and various other phrases on a single basis. The closing hemistich ἕζετο δ᾽ αὐτός# is unique.

Also noteworthy is the fact that instances S1 (Kalkhas) and S2 (Nestor) in Iliad 1 and S10 (Mentor) in Odyssey 2 share the same overall pattern of expanded (3-4 line) description of the speaker between the alternation-formula #Ἤτοι ᾽ Ὣς φάτο. . . and the address-formula #ὅ σφιν ἐΰφρονέων. . .·

§7   (a) X finishes and sits; (Y) stands   Il. 1.68 / 1.245-46 / Od. 2.224
          (b) Identification of Y   Il. 1.69 / 1.248 / Od. 2.225
          (c) Expanded description of Y   Il. 1.70-72 / 1.249-52 / Od. 2.226-7
          (d) Address-formula   Il. 1.73 = 1.253 = Od. 2.228

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[7] Lohmann 1970:9-11. One of the earliest (and still very useful) studies is of course that of Arend 1933 (esp. 116-21); see also Edwards 1980.

It has been suggested (Lang 1983) that the expansion at §7(c) accomodates the description of a character who has not previously been mentioned in the story, and so provides a means for his introduction. The fact is that the three passages cited in §7 do indeed coincide with the first appearance of Kalkhas, Nestor, and Mentor, respectively, in the text of the poems. In the case of Priam (S6), already well-known by the time of the Trojan Assembly in *Iliad* 7, the §7(c)-element is missing, and the scene instead follows the pattern §7(a)-(b)-(d) (= *Il.* 7.365/366/367). However, the assumption—a highly *textual* one—implicit in the notion of the "first appearance" of a character may well be inappropriate to oral literature. This assumption is especially conspicuous in Lang's unlikely suggestion that the figure of Nestor does not belong originally to "the Trojan War story, or even . . . the *Iliad* itself," but is instead an "importation," and for this reason is given an "unprecedented and elaborate introduction" in *Iliad* 1 (1983:140-41). It may risk less distortion to concentrate instead on the function that an expanded description appears to serve both within its own narrative context and also in its relation to other passages that can be identified as allomorphs.

Significantly enough, the remaining two instances of the alternation-formula precede the speeches of Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.101) and Alexandros (*Il.* 7.354) respectively, both of whose Counterstatements reject the advice of the previous speaker (Kalkhas-Akhilleus/Antenor) and thus signal the need for an intercessor (Nestor/Priam). It is especially worth noting how the pattern outlined in §7 also structures the introduction to Agamemnon's reply to Kalkhas (*Il.* 1.101-5), but with a crucial difference at the level of content:

§8   (a) Ἤτοι ὅ γ᾽ ὣς εἰπὼν κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετο· τοῖσι δ᾽ ἀνέστη   101
      (b) ἥρως Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων   102
      (c) ἀχνύμενος. μένεος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφὶ μέλαιναι   103
           πίμπλαντ᾽, ὄσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἐΐκτην·   104
      (d) Κάλχαντα πρώτιστα κακ᾽ ὀσσόμενος προσέειπε   105

          He spoke thus and sat down again, and among them rose up
          Atreus' son the hero wide-ruling Agamemnon
          raging, the heart within filled black to the brim with anger
          from beneath, but his two eyes showed like fire in their blazing.
          First of all he eyed Kalkhas bitterly and spoke to him.

This variation in turn suggests that the alternation-formula in the sequence (a)-(b) marks a point at which the ensuing action offers distinct alternatives. One speaker finishes and sits, another rises and is identified, generally by way of patronymic and/or a name + epithet formula. What he says may either affirm or reject the previous Statement, and the sequence (c)-(d) allows for a prolepsis of the nature of his response by making reference to the basis for his authority—Kalkhas (S1): seercraft from

Apollo; Nestor (S2): command of rhetoric, longevity; Mentor (S10): authority delegated by Odysseus—and the quality of his intention in speaking. The case of Agamemnon in §8 is conspicuous in the degree to which the imputation of malicious intent fills the entire (c) section. In terms of narrative logic, the colon κακ᾽ ὀσσόμενος προσέειπε# [he eyed bitterly and spoke to him] in the address-formula at 105 follows "naturally" from the two lines that precede it, and *a fortiori* the same can be said of each instance of the formula #ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν in the passages charted above in §7.

Nestor's advice on the construction of a defensive wall out of the pyre of the cremated dead in *Iliad* 7 (S5)—a σῆμα whose monumentality threatens to eclipse the fame of the Trojan wall built by Poseidon and Apollo (*Il*. 7.443-63; 12.13-33)—can also be adduced here. His speech (327-43) is enframed by the formulas already identified as markers of Mediation: Crisis (the Trojan threat to the ships)-Assembly (informal, and for this reason lacking the formula for alternation of speakers)-Goodwill (325). Here the address-formula ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων . . . is preceded by a set of lines (324-25) that advert to Nestor's *ethos* as a Counselor: τοῖς ὁ γέρων πάμπρωτος ὑφαίνειν ἤρχετο μῆτιν / Νέστωρ, οὗ καὶ πρόσθεν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή [the aged man began to weave his counsel before them | first, Nestor, whose advice had shown best before this]. These lines appear again a few books later (*Il*. 9.93-94) in the scene in which the embassy to Akhilleus is proposed (S7), and the second line is repeated at *Odyssey* 24.52 (S14). Moreover, their match with the expansion-element at §7(c) is obvious.

The remaining instances of #ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν (*Il*. 15.285; *Od*. 7.158, 24.53) occur when the issue is no less critical, for they arise in situations that follow upon conspicuous violations of the natural or ethical order of things. The speech (S13) of Thoas in *Iliad* 15 is prompted by Apollo's sudden infusion of strength into the half-dead Hektor, and succeeds in rousing the Greeks to defend themselves against the Trojan assault on their ships (285-99). Insofar as the intercession of Kalkhas in the first book is sought to account for the unexpected plague that strikes the Akhaians, it may also be grouped in this category; and the same can be said of the seer Halitherses' interpretation of the omen of the eagles that interrupts the Assembly on Ithaka (*Od*. 2.146-56). In *Odyssey* 24.35-59, the shade of Agamemnon recounts (S14) how the unnatural keening of Thetis and the Nereids almost drove the Greeks to abandon Akhilleus' funeral rites until Nestor, παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς# (51), restrained them from taking flight in their ships. Finally (S15), when Odysseus concludes his first speech to the Phaiakians by withdrawing from their midst and sitting in the ashes of the hearth (*Od*. 7.153-54), the aged Ekheneos breaks the ensuing silence to draw attention

to this breach of custom and demand a hospitable response from Alkinoos (155-66).

The homogeneity of the situations that mark the appearance of an intercessory figure makes their parameters fairly easy to map. In every case, the prior course of events in the story has reached a Crisis, a significant juncture or node at which narrative possibilities fork in different directions. The alternative vectors are as distinct as they are antithetical: death by plague vs. remedy (S1), withdrawal vs. participation of Akhilleus (S2, S7), retreat vs. perseverance of the Greeks (S3, S4), neglect vs. performance of burial rites (S5, S14), defeat vs. defense (S5, S13), retention vs. restitution of Helen (S6), attack vs. defense (S8), disruption through anarchy (S9, S10) or vendetta (S12) vs. social integration, homicide vs. survival of Telemakhos (S11), neglect vs. performance of the rites of hospitality (S15). A cursory glance at these alternatives (and a busier mind) could easily group them under fewer and more generic kinds of opposition. More important than their reduction to a single polarity, however—at the risk of overlooking the richness of innovation even within formal constraints—is to notice once again the coimplication of *ethos* and context that they point up.

Despite the prominent role played by the ethical formula ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν (along with its reflexes) as the mark of an intercessory figure, that mark is itself conditioned by situational factors. This is clearest when—in over 60% (5 of 8X) of the cases in which it appears in formal Assembly scenes—#ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων . . . is preceded by the formulaic alternation of speakers, expressed four times by the line Ἤτοι ὅ γ᾽ ὣς εἰπὼν κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετο· τοῖσι δ᾽ ἀνέστη and once (*Il*. 1.245-48 = §6) by a version of that formula stretched to accomodate additional description. Here Mediation figures merely as one among several divergent narrative vectors opened up by the simple fact of Alternation. While it is true that there can be no intercession without the figure of the Mediator—which would seem to privilege *ethos*—the latter's presence is itself dependent on the specific situational parameters that call for intercession "in the first place." The two reciprocally constitute each other. Further, intercessors do not even arise necessarily from their context, but are instead included in the range of possibilities their context admits. The Other who gets up to speak next may well in fact be an Antagonist like Agamemnon in his reply to Kalkhas (*Il*. 1.101-2), or like Paris (*Il*. 7.354-55), who rises to challenge Antenor's advice in the Trojan Assembly. In terms of the course of events in the narrative and the situations that crystallize in that course, Mediator and Antagonist occupy alternative nodes through which the narrative can pass, and which in their turn (as we will see in the next section) offer further narrative options:

§9

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                                            ANTAGONIST....
                                          /
                        ANTAGONIST   ─────
                      /                    \
                     /                      MEDIATOR ─┐        REJECTION....
ALTERNATION ────────                                  │      /
                     \                      MEDIATOR ─┘──────
                      \                                       \
                        MEDIATOR ──────────                    APPROVAL...
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The possibility that the Antagonist's speech may be answered by yet another antagonistic figure instead of a Mediator is realized in the complex exchange between Agamemnon and Akhilleus in *Iliad* 1, comprising a total of six separate speeches in whose course the intercession of Athene (with an additional three speeches) is embedded. Moreover, and more importantly, Alternation in the above schema is itself just one of several possibilities engaged along the forking path of a far more extensive concatenation of events in Book 1, stretching back at least as far as Khryses' (rejected) Appeal to Agamemnon—if not beyond it, into the unrecorded voices of the tradition. Viewed in terms of its interdependent relation with its context, *ethos* too therefore seems less a privileged essence somehow qualitatively distinct from the events that swirl around, impinge on and flow from it, and more like a simple event itself: a verbal construct, a node, a point of juncture in the narrative design. An examination of the response to Mediation will carry these reflections farther.

3: *Response*

       In the course of a critical situation that strains social harmony, custom or verisimilitude, an Elder—or one like him, precociously endowed with prudence and command of persuasive rhetoric—rises to speak. Narrative logic dictates that the response to his speech take one of three forms: outright approval, outright rejection, or some partial acceptance (along with partial denial) of (all or part of) his advice by (all or part of) his audience. Outright approval accounts for nine (= 60%) of the fifteen cases under review (S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S11, S13, S14, S15), with partial acceptance—taking the form of either (1) acknowledgment of the soundness of the advice but failure to implement it (S2), or (2) approval by some but not all of the addressees (S12)—comprising an

additional 13%. The fact that nearly three-quarters of the speeches introduced by an address-formula that explicitly adverts to the speaker's Goodwill in Crisis earn a positive response marks this outcome with high probability in the narrative and thus (from the viewpoint of the external audience) a high degree of expectation. This of course says nothing of the ultimate soundness of the advice thus given and accepted. Good counsel may fall on deaf ears, but it is equally possible that advice that in the long run precipitates the demise of those who follow it may initially win resounding approbation. The latter case in fact opens a potentially ironic rift between the (abstract) level of the story and that of the (concrete) narrative itself—to borrow Genette's terms.[8] Priam's counsel (S6) to offer restitution of everything but Helen herself—yet another indication of impaired judgment in that administration—only helps to confirm Troy's doom, despite the fact that the Trojans approve of it heartily (*Il.* 7.379). Nestor's advice to construct a defensive wall around the ships (S5) is hailed by the Akhaians (*Il.* 7.344), and in fact proves to be of no small tactical value, yet also draws down Poseidon's wrath when they fail to make proper sacrifice before building it—a procedural detail Nestor apparently overlooks mentioning. The most conspicuous example, however, is Patroklos' approval of Nestor's suggestion in *Iliad* 16 to borrow and fight in the armor of Akhilleus, which brings about the surrogate's death at the same time as it is essential in advancing the story of Akhilleus' return. Ironic Mediation (for lack of a better descriptive term) seems in fact to characterize much of Nestor's advice in the *Iliad*; we will return to this issue at a later point.

Approbation can take a variety of forms—or better, comes to expression at a number of levels—depending on whether the Mediator's speech is followed by another speech (*mimesis*) that expresses outright approval, or else by the narrative description (*diegesis*) of actions that implement his advice, with or without some reference to the attitude of his

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[8] Genette 1980:25-29. After a brief review of the often contrary uses of the terms "narrative" and "story" in contemporary literary discourse, Genette offers the following working definitions: "I propose . . . to use the word *story* for the signified or narrative content," which he specifies as the "totality of actions and situations taken in themselves, without regard to the medium, linguistic or other, through which knowledge of that totality comes to us: an example would be the adventures experienced by Ulysses from the fall of Troy to his arrival on Calypso's island." The term *narrative* is reserved by him to denote "the signifier, statement, discourse or narrative text itself," that is, "the oral or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or series of events: thus we would term *narrative of Ulysses* the speech given by the hero to the Phaeacians in Books IX-XII of the *Odyssey*, and also these four books themselves, that is, the section of Homeric text that purports to be the faithful transcription of that speech." For additional examples, and an application of these terms to analysis of temporality in the *Odyssey,* see Bergren 1983.

audience.[9] Which form is taken does not seem to matter greatly in the long run: the story advances through speech and action almost indifferently. In either case, acceptance is always marked by verbal echoes of the spoken advice. Thus Nestor's (mimetic) injunction to the terrified Akhaians at the funeral of Akhilleus (*Od.* 24.54: #ἔσχεσθ᾽, Ἀργεῖοι . . . [Stay, Argives . . .]) achieves responsion in the diegesis of their action subsequent to his speech (57: Ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἱ ἔσχοντο φόβου μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί [So he spoke, and the great-hearted Akhaians stayed from flight]). The diegesis of Alkinoos' response to the advice of Ekheneos (*Od.* 7.169-70: ὦρσεν ἐπ᾽ ἐσχαρόφιν καὶ ἐπὶ θρόνου εἶσε φαεινοῦ Ι υἱὸν ἀναστήσας . . . [and raised him up from the fireside, and set him in a shining chair, Ι displacing his son . . .]) is cast in language that echoes the old man's words (162-63: ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δὴ ξεῖνον μὲν ἐπὶ θρόνου ἀργυροήλου Ι εἷσον ἀναστήσας [But come, raise the stranger up and seat him on a silver-studded Ι chair]). A similar response follows the tempered advice Amphinomos gives the suitors in *Odyssey* 16, though here the responsion does not cross levels but remains instead exegetic in both cases: the narrator's comment that Amphinomos pleased Penelope most because of his command of speech (398: #ἥνδανε μύθοισι) is answered by the description of how the suitors receive what he says (406: Ὣς ἔφατ᾽ Ἀμφίνομος· τοῖσιν δ᾽ ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος [So Amphinomos spoke, and his word was pleasing to them]). Although the line is exactly repeated at *Odyssey* 20.247, and is used (with substitution of names) once (*Od.* 13.16) of Alkinoos and four times (*Od.* 18.50;290, 21.143;269) of Antinoos—where the metrical equivalence of these three names might have some bearing on the number of formulas they share in common—the responsion between *Odyssey* 16.398 and 406 is unique.

Most often, and at either or both levels, the vocabulary of approval centers formulaically on the activities of praise (ἐπαίνειν), hearkening (κλύειν), and obedience (πείθεσθαι). There is of course nothing unusual in this; the expression of assent to speeches of any kind, with or without qualification of the intent of the speaker, in most cases has recourse to these verbs.[10] Nearly half (4 of 9X) of the occasions of outright

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[9] The terms are ultimately Plato's (*Rep.* 392C-95); for a discussion, see Genette 1980:162-66.

10 Formulaic lines expressing approval in fact on the whole enjoy such wide application throughout the poems—οἱ δ᾽ ἐπανέστησαν πείθοντό τε ποιμένι λαῶν (*Il.* 2.85), Ὣς ἔφατ᾽, Ἀργεῖοι δέ μέγ᾽ ἴαχον (2X) . . . Ι . . . Ι μῦθον ἐπαινήσαντες (*Il.* 2.333-35), Ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνησαν (8X) βασιλῆες (*Il.* 7.344), Ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἱ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀνήϊξαν μεγάλῳ ἀλαλητῷ (2X) (*Od.* 24.463)—that they carry little semantic weight in the context of Mediation except as markers of assent.

approval when that intention is marked as kindly (ἐϋφρονέων) are shaped according to the extensive pattern introduced by #῝Ως ἔφατ᾽ followed by a description of audience response. Two from this group (*Il.* 7.379 = 15.300) are noteworthy in that they belong to a set of speeches that win approval expressed by the formula ῝Ως ἔφαθ᾽, οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ᾽ ἐπίθοντο [So he spoke, and they listened well to him and obeyed him] (7X, 6X). As L. Muellner (1976:18-19) points out, the line "is always used . . . after an order or exhortation by a man [or woman (cf. *Od*. 6.247, 20.157)] in authority (master of slaves, leader of warriors) to a group of men [or women] (servants, warriors, etc.)." Priam's is the first instance (S6); the second is that of Thoas (S13), whose preeminence in debate among the Greek youth marks him with qualities conventionally reserved for older men. The same line is also used twice of the response to statements made by Nestor. One occasion (*Od*. 3.477), following his order for Telemakhos' chariot to be hitched, is not especially significant. No mediation properly so-called is involved (the formula #ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων . . . is not used), and the passage serves mainly to identify the old man as someone whose commands should be obeyed. The other instance (*Il*. 9.79) bears more weight, however, since it describes the response of the Akhaian leaders to (rather mundane) advice from Nestor that directly precedes his raising of the far more delicate issue—in a speech (S7) introduced by the intercessory #ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων formula—of reconciliation between Agamemnon and Akhilleus (92-113). It wins from Agamemnon the reply ὦ γέρον, οὔ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατέλεξας [Old man, this was no lie when you spoke of my madness] (115), which is unique in the poems.

        In one case (S2), and in a few other passages directly associated with intercessory figures (Nestor, Priam) but lacking the formal markers of Alternation and/or Goodwill, a positive response is expressed by the formulaic ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες [Yes, old man, all this you have said is right and fitting] (*Il*. 1.286, 8.146, 24.379; cf. *Od*. 3.331). The line as a whole—with substitution of different Vocative forms (γέρον 3X, τέκος 2X, θεά 2X, γύναι 1X, φίλος 1X; and cf. τέκνον ἐμόν replacing / πάντα υ - / at *Od*. 22.486) between the B2 and C1 caesuras—accounts for well over a quarter (10 of 35X) of all instances of κατὰ μοι῀ραν in the poems, and fully 52% of the cases (19X) in which κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-# completes the line. Four of the remaining nine cases show variations on a line concluding {τοῦτο} ἔπος κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-# [spoke this word right and fitting]; on five occasions the final colon is preceded by a conjunction (ἐπεὶ) or short adverbial modifier (e.g. οὐ). An allomorph of κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-# appears four times in the phrase κατὰ μοῖραν κατέλεξ-# [recounted right and fitting], backing the colon up

against the B2 caesura.

This is not the place to study the full range of this formula, for which an examination of the allomorphs κατὰ κόσμον [in right order] (13X) and κατ' αἶσαν [properly] (4X) would also be needed. For our purposes here, it will suffice to make a few observations requiring less detailed formulaic analysis. To make the data even more manageable, we can begin by excluding from consideration the four instances of κατὰ μοῖραν κατέλεξ-# (*Od.* 3.331, 8.496, 10.16, 12.35), on the ground that the sense of the verb here (verified contextually) refers more to the completeness or formal arrangement of a prior speech than to its content— in a sense soon to be defined. Mimetic statements incorporating the colon κατὰ μοῖραν κατέλεξ-# in this respect bear a closer resemblance to the use of κατὰ μοῖραν after the A1 (7X) and A2 (5X) caesuras in the diegesis of orderly activities like sitting in neat rows (*Il.* 19.256; *Od.* 4.783 = 8.54), tending flocks (*Od.* 9.309;342;352) or cutting meat (*Od.* 3.457). Five of the thirteen instances of κατὰ κόσμον (*Il.* 10.472, 11.48, 12.85, 17.205, 24.622) also carry this sense. Such occasions all imply a quasi-objective standard to which the activity in question is said to conform, and much the same notion is implicit in the use of κατὰ μοῖραν κατέλεξ-# as well, where the issue is that of the point-by-point completeness of a narrative account.

This does not seem to be the case with κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-#, however. Its sense instead usually intends the far subtler (ethical) standard of what should or ought to be done or said in a given situation, and so registers assent in terms of generally tacit assumptions about appropriateness and what is "fitting." Thus Nestor's intercession (S2) in *Ilia* 1.254-84 amounts to a lecture on the rights pertaining to the man (= Akhilleus) who is κάρτερος [stronger] (280) and the one (= Agamemnon) who is φέρτερος [more authoritative] (281), respectively. It is a lesson in status and social hierarchy that elicits from Agamemnon the admission ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες (286). Essentially the same lesson—though more succinctly expressed—informs Iris' advice to Poseidon to withdraw from battle rather than risk the anger of Zeus (*Il.* 15.201-4), which wins a similar formulaic response from him (206). Diomedes acknowledges as much (*Il.* 8.146) in reply to Nestor's advice to retreat. This is prompted by a bolt from Zeus thrown in front of their chariot—which incidentally assimilates Nestor to the figure of an interpreter of omens—and is couched in a homily on the disproportionate powers of gods and men. The compliment is returned twice: first (in the shortened form ἐπεὶ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες) when Nestor approves (*Il.* 9.59) of Diomedes' commitment to fight in the belief that Greek victory at Troy is divinely sanctioned; and later (with substitution of φίλος for γέρον in the whole-line formula) in answer to

the warrior's observation that younger men than Nestor should have the job of waking sleeping generals (*Il*. 10.169). Related to the first of these two instances is the disguised Hermes' use of ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον . . . (*Il*. 24.379) to acknowledge the appropriateness of Priam's inference that the gods approve his mission to Akhilleus.

Equally interesting is the fact that over 60% (12 of 19X) of the time, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-# appears in situations that expressly advert to the generational gap between interlocutors. Young or at least explicitly younger people (Agamemnon, Diomedes, "Hermes," Leokritos, "Athene") use it of old ones (Nestor 3X, Priam, Mentor) five times (*Il*. 1.286, 8.146, 24.379; *Od*. 2.251, 3.331), and on seven occasions (*Il*. 9.59, 10.109, 23.626; *Od*. 17.580, 18.170, 21.278, 22.486) it marks the approval (once ironic) given by an elderly figure (Nestor 3X, Eumaios, Eurynome, the Beggar, Eurykleia) to the proposal of a younger one (Diomedes 2X, Akhilleus, Telemakhos, Antinoos, Penelope, Odysseus). In the remaining instances (*Od*. 4.266; 9.351, 13.385, 20.37; 8.397), the formula appears where generational difference is not at issue, but in contexts that nonetheless advert to a difference in status (husband/wife, mortal/god, king/subject). Only once (*Od*. 8.141) is it used between social and generational equals (Euryalos/Laodamas); and twice it is reserved for the poet's own editorial comments (*Od*. 7.227, 13.48).

At least two conclusions can be drawn from these statistics. The first obviously returns us to statements made earlier about traits that accrue to the *ethos* of intercessory figures, among whom advanced age is a prominent characteristic. The Mediator's age not only gives him purchase on the kind of moral (and circumspective) knowledge to which the colon κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-# refers, but also empowers him to recognize when others far younger also give "right and fitting" advice. Far more important, however, is the fact that his voice is always that of convention. Advice endorsed as κατὰ μοῖραν generally embodies traditional folk-wisdom, which lends itself easily to summary in gnomic form: Respect authority. Don't abuse privilege. Yield to necessity. Old men do one thing, young men another. Even the mighty are flexible. Give honor to elders. Trust in the gods. Honor guests. Avoid bad company . . .. What is spoken κατὰ μοῖραν therefore appeals to and confirms the ethical values to which the audience subscribes. Moreover, this community of fictional listeners within the narrative is implicitly always represented as sharing the same moral expectations as the community in which the narrative itself is performed. Their ethical horizons are roughly isomorphic, granted even qualitative differences (heroic/mundane) between them that in their turn make for experiential differences (e.g., the opportunity for direct

intercourse with gods) that maintain what has been called "epic distance."[11] The formulaic colon κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-# adverts at least to this common horizon, and this accounts for the moral sense made by what transpires in the narrative—to what might be called its ethical closure.

These observations have not digressed too far from the main point. It is simply that the approval won nearly three-quarters of the time by the Mediator's speech is assured both by the proleptic encoding of the grounds for that response— e.g., through formulaic reference to Goodwill and (more generally) to the narrative possibilities inherent in patterns of Crisis and Alternation—and also by the degree to which that encoding assumes the same approval in the audience that receives the narrative. This tacit fusion of ethical horizons is in fact clearest in those cases (4X) in which the Mediator's advice is rejected.

Here more than in contexts in which expectations are fulfilled, the versatility of narrative, or at least the number and range of divergent narrative vectors, becomes especially apparent. This is of course not to suggest that the denial of expectations is any less traditional a feature of oral narratives, that such denial is any less formulaic than fulfillment of expectation, or that it is not a possibility subject to formulaic encoding and thus itself an expectation capable of being prefigured and fulfilled. The fact is that the outright rejection of a well-intentioned Mediator's counsel occurs in roughly one-quarter (4 of 15X) of the scenes now under consideration, and in half this group (*Il.* 1.101-20; 18.284-313) it is keyed in the diegesis that precedes the actual (spoken) denial. In the first case

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[11] See e.g. Bakhtin 1981:13: "an absolute epic distance separates the epic world from contemporary reality, that is, from the time in which the singer (the author and his audience) lives." The claim, like the terminology itself, is borrowed from the Neoclassicism of Schlegel, Goethe, and Schiller; see Todorov 1984:85-91. How implicitly *readerly and textual* a perspective it embodies is clear from such statements as (17): "the epic past is locked into itself and walled off from all subsequent times by an impenetrable boundary, isolated (and this is most important) from that eternal present of children and descendants in which the epic singer and his listeners are located . . . .. [T]radition isolates the world of the epic from personal experience, from any new insights, from any personal initiative in understanding and interpreting, from new points of view and evaluations . . .. The epic world is constructed in the zone of an absolute distanced image, beyond the sphere of possible contact with the developing, incomplete and therefore re-thinking and re-evaluating present." It is hard to know where to begin addressing these claims; only a few points can be made here. The fusion of ethical horizons between narrated audience and performance audience in itself of course does much to dismantle the "boundary" mentioned, along with most of the argument whose foundation it provides. See also e.g. Goody and Watt 1968:31-34 and Ong 1982:46-49 on the homeostasis of traditional societies, in which the preservation of tradition is not a matter of the transmission of static (and, as it were, textual) content from one generation to the next but instead an essentially interactive process. It is the result of an open-ended and often highly flexible dialog between memory and the immediate temporal horizon of the audience for whom the past is on each occasion performed and also re-formed, transmitted and at the same time constructed anew.

(S1) this is achieved by the extended characterization of Agamemnon's ill-will towards Kalkhas, running from the #ἀχνύμενος with which it opens (*Il.* 1.103) to the address-formula (105) that closes with κακ' ὀσσόμενος προσέειπε# [he eyed bitterly and spoke to him] (= §8)—with which compare Iris' denial of such an intent towards Priam in the line οὐ μὲν γάρ τοι ἐγὼ <u>κακὸν ὀσσομένη</u> τόδ' ἱκάνω [I come to you not eyeing you with evil intention] (*Il.* 24.172). In the second (S8), Hektor's reply to Poulydamas is introduced by the shorter but highly pregnant #τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη . . . [Then looking darkly at him, he spoke...] (*Il.* 18.284), whose resonance Holoka's recent study has exhaustively explored.[12]

Hektor's confrontation with his Double in *Iliad* 18 indeed offers a prime example of a widespread scenic pattern for Rejection of sound advice, and deserves close (if still incomplete) examination. It should be noted that the narrative relation between these two figures is entirely structured in terms of approved and rejected Mediation.[13] The four scenes in which they appear together in fact exhibit a fine rhythmic alternation of Approval (A) and Rejection (B) that reaches its climax in Book 18:

§10   A1   12.60-81
         B1   12.210-50
         A2   13.722-53
         B2   18.249-313

Moreover, the interlocking formulaic response among these scenes is a rich one, as the following chart (§11) attempts to show:

§11	A1	B1	A2	B2
(a) IMPASSE	horses balk at cross-ing Greek ditch	omen terrifies Tro-jans, who balk at attacking	Trojans pinned down by Aiantes & bowmen	Trojans terrified by return of Akhilleus
(b) ADDRESS	δὴ τότε <u>Που-λυδάμας θρα-σὺν Ἕκτορα εἶπε παραστάς</u> (60)	=A1 (210)	εἴ μὴ <u>Πουλυ-δάμας θρασὺν Ἕκτορα εἶπε παραστάς</u> (725)	ὅ σφιν ἐΰφρο-νέων ἀγορή-σατο καὶ μετέ-ειπεν (253)

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[12] See Holoka 1983. His insight is that the nominal meaning of the formula is virtually empty, and in any case irrelevant to its function in the poems—which is instead to evoke an implicit narrative pattern that structures the relations between socially superior and inferior figures.

[13] See Redfield 1975:143-53 for a general discussion of the contrast between Hektor and Poulydamas.

(c) APPEAL	ἀλλ᾽ ἄγεθ᾽, ὡς ἂν ἐγὼ εἴπω, πειθώμεθα πάντες (75)	νῦν αὖτ᾽ ἐξ-ερέω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα (215)	αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶ ναι ἄριστα (735)	ἀλλ᾽ ἴομεν προτὶ ἄστυ, πίθεσθέ μοι· ὧδε γὰρ ἔσται (260)
(d) REACTION	Ὣς φάτο Που-λυδάμας, ἅδε δ᾽ Ἕκτορι μῦθος ἀπήμων (80)	τὸν δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπό-δρα ἰδὼν προ-σέφη κορυθαί-ολος Ἕκτωρ (230)	= A1 (748)	= B1 (284)
(e1) RESPONSE	diegesis: Hektor dismounts (81)	speech (231-50) plus diegesis (251)	= A1 (749) plus speech (750-53)	speech (285-309)
(e2) RESPONSE	so do Trojans	Trojans follow Hektor (251-52)	none	Ὣς Ἕκτωρ ἀγό-ρευ᾽, ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδη-σαν (310)
(f) EDITORIAL	none	none	none	νήπιοι· ἐκ γάρ σφεων φρένας εἵλετο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη (311)

A few notes are in order here. (1) At §11(a)B2, the terror of the Trojans at Akhilleus' reappearance is so great that they violate the rules of Assembly by all standing in mass instead of sitting down and taking turns to rise and speak (*Il.* 18.246-47). This precludes use of the regular formula for Alternation—Ἤτοι ὅ γ᾽ ὣς εἰπὼν κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετο· τοῖσι δ᾽ ἀνέστη—examined earlier, whose presence here would otherwise assimilate this scene even more closely to S1, S3, S6, and S10. The §11B2 pattern in *Iliad* 18 thus constitutes an allomorph of the scene outlined above in §7, with the expanded (three-line) description of Poulydamas' *ethos* (250-52) matching the §7(c) element and the line τοῖσι δὲ Πουλύδαμας πεπνυμένος ἦρχ᾽ ἀγορεύειν [First to speak among them was the careful Poulydamas] (249) replacing the Alternation formula, to form the sequence §7(a$_1$)-(b)-(c)-(d). (2) The line quoted at §11(b)A2 is the protasis of an extensive contrafactual narrative pattern (always in inverted order) "Then X would have happened if not Y," in which the apodosis is expressed either by ἔνθα κε{ν} (11X) or καί νυ κε{ν} (28X). It too serves to mark Crisis in the narrative, the forking of alternate (and antithetical) vectors, and often the appearance of intercessory figures. While its importance for an understanding of the full resonance of Mediation is undeniable, its analysis must be deferred to a separate study. (3) Elements listed alongside the category of Appeal (c) have been severely limited to items in which some colonic responsion can be shown. A broader kind of

responson at the level of thematic content in Poulydamas' speeches—especially the repeated reference to Hektor's intractability to persuasion, and to the dichotomy between Counselor and Warrior—warrants extensive study. (4) The same can be said of the content of the speeches in reply, at §11(e1)B1/A2/B2.

Two aspects of this pattern call for further comment here. The first concerns the presence in §11B1 of an element that identifies an important subgroup of critical situations that include Mediation among their narrative possibilities, and additionally serves to draw the figures of Counselor and Prophet even closer together. Though the majority of Mediators are not professional seers, the boundary between these two types remains a flexible one, and is drawn as much by their function in context as by reference to some fixed set of credentials. Thus as the parameters of the situation require, the role elsewhere reserved for adepts like Khalkas (*Il*. 1.92-100), Halitherses (*Od*. 2.146-76), and Theoklymenos (*Od*. 20.345-57) can be shifted to figures such as Poulydamas and Nestor (*Il*. 8.130-44)—and, for that matter, Amphinomos (*Od*. 20.240-46) as well. In the case of Poulydamas in §11(a)B1, in fact, the identification is quite explicit, for the Trojan concludes his speech with the claim ὧδέ χ᾽ ὑποκρίναιτο θεοπρόπος, ὅς σάφα θυμῷ | εἰδείη τεράων καί οἱ πειθοίατο λαοί [So an interpreter of the gods would answer, one who knew | in his mind the truth of portents, and whom the people believed in] (*Il*. 12.228-29). Once again, *ethos* and context are not entirely distinct, but instead seem to be made of interchangeable parts.

The remaining pair of instances (S9, S10) involving the dismissal of an intercessor's advice also match this sub-pattern of Omen-Mediation-Approval/ Rejection. Both occur during the Ithakan Assembly in *Odyssey* 2, and represent the abusive response of suitors to attempts at Mediation by Halitherses and Mentor, respectively, each of whose speeches is introduced by ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν (*Od*. 2.160;228). The close proximity of these two scenes—separated only by the speech of Telemakhos (208-23)—along with their essential identity of content and structure, in fact suggest the doubling of a single pattern:

§12	[(a) Omen (eagles)	146-56]
	(b) Mediator (Halitherses - Prophet) speaks	157-76
	(c) Antagonist (Eurymakhos) rejects (b)	177-207
	[(d) Telemakhos speaks	208-23]
	(e) Mediator (Mentor - Elder) speaks	224-41
	(f) Antagonist (Leokritos) rejects (e)	242-56
	[(g) Assembly dissolved	257]

The doubling of elements §12(b)-(c) in (e)-(f) is obvious, and is additionally reinforced by the status of Leokritos in the second group. Unlike Eurymakhos (30X), who takes second place only to Antinoos (56X) for prominence among the suitors, this Leokritos (Euenorides) is a genuine nonentity, merely the shadow Eurymakhos casts in this type-scene. Apart from his speech here, his only other appearance in the poem comes twenty books later at the moment of his (equally formulaic) death (*Od.* 22.294-96): speared from behind by Telemakhos, kidney and diaphragm pierced, face flat in the dust.

Just as clear is the homology between the initial elements §12(a)-(c) and the pattern of Mediation and Rejection in §11B1 and B2. Even more striking, however, is the similarity between §12(a)-(f) in its full form and the overall (though more complex) pattern of Omen-Mediation-Rejection in the Akhaian Assembly in *Iliad* 1. This is especially the case with regard to the sequence of types of intercessory figure (Prophet : Elder :: Halitherses/Kalkhas : Mentor/Nestor) in both scenes. Another parallel between the two Assemblies is perhaps worth noting at §12(f), where Agamemnon's approving response to Nestor (*Il.* 286: κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες#) is inverted in Leokritos' jibe at Mentor, σὺ δ' οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες# [You did not speak properly] (*Od.* 2.251). Perhaps more significant are features that the abusive responses to prophetic Mediation share in these three passages. Agamemnon's rejection in *Iliad* 1, Hektor's in *Iliad* 12, and that of Eurymakhos in *Odyssey* 2 all take the form of (1) an initial impugning of the wits and competence of the Prophet/Counselor (*Il.* 1.106-8 : *Il.* 12.233-34 : *Od.* 2.178-79), followed in the latter two scenes by (2) dismissal of the mantic value of the omen in question (*Il.* 12.237-40 : *Od.* 2.181-82) and (3) a boastful claim to possession of prophetic skills more accurate than those of the Mediator (*Il.* 12.235-36; 241 : *Il.* 2.180).

The effect of redundancies like the one embedded in the structure of the Assembly scenes in *Iliad* 1 and *Odyssey* 2—not to mention the A-B-A-B patterning of Hektor's relation to Poulydamas (§10)—is generally to emphasize the message; this is a feature of all signifying systems, and especially ones that rely chiefly on parataxis. The repeated rejection of a Mediator's sound advice only draws attention to how great a violation of conventional conduct has taken place, and so amounts to an implicit justification of the retribution that inevitably follows. This is why a kind of tautology governs all scenes of Mediation. Once it is formulaically established that the Other who rises to speak in Crisis is indeed a Mediator (and not an Antagonist), the outcome stemming from rejection or approval of his advice takes a predetermined course. Acceptance (generally) always leads to success, dismissal always issues in disaster. The necessity of the outcome is clearer in the case of rejection than approval, if only perhaps

because transgression is less usual (4 of 15X = 26%) and certainly more scandalous, a disruption of traditional values that demands a reassertion of the proper way of things. Clearest of all in Homer is the ineluctability of disaster persuant to rejection of a Mediator who is also a Prophet. Despite a widespread scepticism about seercraft that both poems tolerate (at the level of the narrative) in their characters, the privilege that prophecy enjoys at the level of motivation in the story is always confirmed. Nowhere in Homer are prophecies ever disregarded without peril.[14] The response-pattern that links dismissal of the Prophet-Mediator with dismissal of prophecy itself or with the unjustified arrogation of the vision of prophets by the characters (Hektor, Eurymakhos) who reject their advice only emphasizes this point.

The second and final observation to be made with reference to the synoptic table of passages (§11) concerns the editorial comment on the Trojan rejection of Poulydamas' advice in §11(f)B2. Its phrasing— νήπιοι· ἐκ γάρ σφεων φρένας εἵλετο Παλλὰς ᾿Αθήνη# [fools: for Pallas Athene had taken their wits from them] (*Il.* 18.311; cf. 9.377)—ironically echoes Hektor's earlier reproach of his Double in §11B1—εἰ δ᾿ ἐτέον δὴ τοῦτον ἀπὸ σπουδῆς ἀγορεύεις, ǀ ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί [If in all seriousness this is your true argument, then ǀ it is the very gods who ruined the brain within you] (*Il.* 12.233-34). This pair of lines in fact appears once earlier (*Il.* 7.359-60), significantly enough in Alexandros' rebuke of Antenor in the Trojan Assembly scene (S6). The ethical contrast that structures their relationship throughout the poem collapses here into a telling identity. These ironies within the narrative open on a larger sort of irony, however. The editorial #νήπιοι . . . [fools...] in *Iliad* 18 belongs to a large group (31%) of the total number of the occurrences of this noun (15 of 48X) in the poems, which in turn amounts to an even larger percentage (62%) of all instances of the noun in initial position (24X). In all of these instances, as in Hektor's rejection of Poulydamas in *Iliad* 18, the editorial #νήπι- marks a point in the text at which the narrative is interrupted by the poet's own judgment of the foolishness of a character's interpretation of the situation in which he finds himself, generally as the result of bad counsel, which issues in a decision on that character's part to pursue a specific course of action—a judgment justified by proleptic reference to the (disastrous) outcome to which that decision leads. Put more succinctly, the editorial νήπι- always signals a rift in the text between the concrete narrative account on the one hand, and the unfolding of the (abstract) story on the other. In this sense it serves the same

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[14] On prophecy in general in the poems, see e.g. Stockinger 1959; for its narratological function, with specific reference to the Phaiakian and Teiresian prophecies in the *Odyssey*, see Peradotto 1974 and 1980.

function— though with opposite sense—as the contrafactual pattern "Then X would have happened if not Y" alluded to above with reference to §11(b)A2. Both mark a textual irony, an opening through which the priority of motivation at the level of the story over narrative motivation can be seen.

In one case, this textual irony affects the typology of Mediation at its core. We have seen that the nature of the response (Approval/Rejection) to Mediation is sufficient to determine the nature of the ultimate outcome (Success/Failure) of the action, as schematized above in §9. Rejection of a Mediator's advice always precipitates disaster for those who spurn it: Agamemnon (S1), whose mistake is admitted (*Il*. 19.76-144) only after the slaughter of countless Akhaians; Hektor (S8), who acknowledges only too late (*Il*. 22.99-103) the soundness of Poulydamas' counsel; the suitors, whose demise is implicitly sealed by their dismissal of prophetic Mediation in the Ithakan Assembly scene (S9, S10); Eupeithes (S12), the last casualty in the *Odyssey*. On the other hand, approval leads just as inevitably to the success of an endeavor in the ten cases in which it occurs (S2-S7, S11, S13-S15). Ironic possibilities complicate this schema, however. If the advice proposed by a Mediator itself proves to be in some sense unsound, its acceptance can have the same result as unimpeachably good advice that is rejected or (as in *Iliad* 18) bad advice that wins approval. Accomodating this possibility, the fuller range of options thus maps out as follows:

§13

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                                        ┌─ APPROVAL ──── SUCCESS
                          ┌─ (SOUND) ───┤
                          │             └─ REJECTION ─┐
         MEDIATION ───────┤                           ├─ FAILURE
                          └─ (UNSOUND) ──── APPROVAL ─┘
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Nestor's advice to Patroklos at the close of *Iliad* 11 and its implementation much later (*Iliad* 16) make for perhaps the most telling case in point. Sent for news by an Akhilleus whose curiosity betrays anxiousness that undercuts the firmness of his resolve to stay out of battle, Patroklos visits Nestor's camp. Much like Telemakhos in *Odyssey* 3, he finds the old man enframed in a tableau of domestic ritual: at table with a guest (Makhaon), served by his attendant Hekamede, engaged in the pleasure of talk over wine, pale honey, bread, and onion (*Il*. 11.618-44). Though he initially declines an offer to join them (647-54), Patroklos is nonetheless trapped by one of Nestor's prolonged reminiscences (670-762),

which eventually comes full circle to recount his arrival once at the house of Peleus during ritual sacrifice (769-77). The responsion is exact, with Nestor's rising up to take Patroklos by the hand echoed in Akhilleus' gesture to Nestor himself in the analepsis: ἐς δ' ἄγε χειρὸς ἑλών, κατὰ δ' ἑδριάασθαι ἄνωγε [and took him by the hand, led him in and told him to sit down] (646 = 778). Reminiscence of personal glory here modulates into recollection of Peleus' charge to Patroklos to protect the young Akhilleus at Troy (785-90), and then into Nestor's own advice in the present context (790: ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν), that is, that Patroklos borrow the armor, impersonate the Hero, and so win for the Greeks some breathing-space in the fight to defend their ships (794-803).

Patroklos' response is given by the formula (6X, 1X) Ὣς φάτο, τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε [So he spoke, and stirred the feelings in his breast] (804). Four books then intervene, recounting the fated advance of the Trojans, before the narrative resumes again (*Iliad* 16) with the implementation of Nestor's advice. The lacuna is bridged by the simple device of repetition; except for the change of pronouns and the variation of one line (*Il*. 11.799/16.40), the appeal to Akhilleus precisely echoes Nestor's earlier counsel (11.794-803 = 16.36-45). The repetition has the effect of collapsing the distance that separates these two narrative moments, hence effecting a return to the initial (mediatory) situation in *Iliad* 11. The appeal elicits an editorial comment (*Il*. 16.46-47):

§14   Ὣς φάτο λισσόμενος <u>μέγα νήπιος</u>· ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν
        οἷ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι.

        So he spoke, supplicating, <u>the great fool</u>; this was
        his own death and evil destruction he was entreating.

The judgment μέγα νήπιος is a strong one. It occurs in this form only here, though allomorphs of the phrase in the same position (B1-C2) appear on four other occasions, with various particles (τὸ δὲ 2X / σὲ δὲ / ἔτι) filling out the space before the noun. In all but one case (*Od*. 19.530), which describes an infant child, the comment adverts to foolishness portending disaster: Odysseus' crew drunk on the beach while the Kikonians muster their troops (*Od*. 9.44); blind Polyphemos duped by the ruse of the sheep (*Od*. 9.442); the suitors, who take the death of Antinoos from the Beggar's arrow for an accident (*Od*. 22.32), and who stupidly devour Odysseus' stores, unmindful of the master's return (*Od*. 22.370). The closing hemistich ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν# (with allomorphs οὐδ' ἄρ' 5X or τῷ δ' ἄρ' 1X and different inflections of the verb) is likewise reserved for proleptic reference to unseen disaster. Its sense is contrafactual, drawing attention to grief or else total demise that is chosen

unwittingly, hence to the ironic distance between expectation and outcome. The defensive wall of the Greeks proposed by Nestor (S5) was not destined to stop the Trojan assault (*Il*. 12.3); Dolon's boast to return unscathed from his espionage behind enemy lines would prove a hollow one (*Il*. 10.336); on the verge of death, Hektor acknowledges that his hopes for mercy from Akhilleus had been empty (*Il*. 22.356); Odysseus' return from Troy was fated to be painful and prolonged (*Od*. 4.107); the fair west wind that blew from Aiolos' island to Ithaka was only to fail him just within sight of home (*Od*. 10.26); Eupeithes, aggrieved father, sought sweet vengeance but in so doing incurred his own death (*Od*. 24.470).

What links these passages together, and to Patroklos' innocent appeal (*Il*. 16.35-45) to be allowed to impersonate Akhilleus, is the rift they all signal between narrative motivation and motivation at the level of the story. The prominence they give to the exigencies of the story (the sacrifice of Patroklos to the Plan of Zeus) in turn confirms the priority of function over *ethos*, situation, and response within the narrative, at the same time as it also makes Mediation itself a primary tool of that over-arching function. The intercession of Nestor in *Iliad* 11/16 emphasizes even more strikingly than do the other passages examined the role of the Mediator throughout the poems as a kind of "switch" located at a critical juncture in the narrative and (more than other characters) ultimately in the direct employ of the story that guides the unfolding of the narrated events. Plague vs. remedy, social disruption vs. social harmony, defeat vs. victory, ritual propriety vs. neglect of obligations that bind mortals to the gods— the Mediator arises always and only whenever the course of events has reached a fork that leads the narrative along divergent paths and towards different projected ends: failure (often death) on the one hand, success— sometimes death too, but always measured by the specific closure toward which the story moves—on the other. In this sense, and viewed in terms of its function, Mediation represents a cloaked editorial presence in the narrative, and the Mediator himself a kind of editorial figure. This is never clearer than when that Mediation is ironic, since here the distance between expectation and fulfillment, desire and dessert, plan and outcome, narrative and story is possibly its greatest. Homer's comment μέγα νήπιος in *Iliad* 16 only announces more explicitly a prolepsis of disaster already inherent in the Mediator's advice four books earlier, and inhering potentially in all advice given, whatever the authority of its proponent, whenever another rises to speak or to take one's hand in friendship.

4: *Conclusion*

A few conclusions can briefly be ventured now to what has been an

extensive but at the same time also an admittedly incomplete typology of Mediation in Homer. Its very incompleteness is in fact itself a point worth dwelling on.

Despite the emergence of relatively stable contours for that typology, its extent still remains largely uncharted. Each new instance of specific responsion among cola, lines, and generic scenes only seems to open on ever wider and more intricate and more interdependent patterns of responsion. These call for further study, but at the same time also implicitly challenge the approach taken in this analysis. Structurally, the typology is governed by what we have called co-implication, by the fact that its isolated parts all stand in metonymic relation to some whole that never reaches full expression in the text. And it is thanks to this that our approach in terms of categories of *ethos*, situation, and response remains at best a very rough heuristic strategy.

To take only the most striking example, we have suggested that the category of *ethos* ("no more or less arbitrary than any other point of departure"—and no less dangerous, too) apparently enjoys no special privilege. Its boundaries are so flexible—shifting among the figures of Youth and Elder, Prophet, Counselor, Nurse, Double, Father, Husband, Herald, King—that it is tempting to conclude that what passes for character is merely a cluster of traits (goodwill, memory, sorrow, prudence, command of persuasive speech, circumspection, soundness of mind) around a proper name, which in its turn—and far from signifying some unique essence—only marks as it were an empty locus of narrative potentials.[15] What strengthens this impression is the degree to which *ethos* itself in all its flexibility seems to be a function of contextual constraints. Mediator no less than (say) Antagonist rises to speak or fails to rise only within and by reason of prolepses embedded in a certain situation (for example, Crisis). Situation is in turn no independent variable, but instead is plausibly determined by prior concatenations of events in the narrative, which stretch back towards some vanishing-point in the tradition of the story. This is why, for example, the last passage examined in our study (*Iliad* 11/16) is no less valid an instance of Mediation despite its lack of most of the explicit formulaic cues (Debate, Alternation, Ethical Expansion, Goodwill) that seemed so definitive for our study in the first place. All that counted there, as we saw, was the functional identification of the

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15 See e.g. Barthes 1974:190-91: "Character is an adjective, an attribute, a predicate.... What gives the illusion that the sum [sc. of traits predicated of a narrative character] is supplemented by a precious remainder (something like *individuality*....) is the Proper Name, the difference completed by what is *proper* to it. The proper name enables the person to exist outside the semes, whose sum nonetheless constitutes it entirely." See e.g. Rimmon-Kenan 1983:29-42 (from whom this quote is drawn [39]) for a brief summary of the problem of the narrative status of "character" and references to more extensive discussions.

speaker with a kind of narrative "switch," a juncture at which alternative endings offer themselves for realization, and at which the "choice" of one or the other lets the priority of story over narrative show itself. Moreover, it shows itself over and perhaps in a sense sometimes even despite motivation in the narrative, for it is just this ironic difference it generates that makes Patroklos' death (unlike Hektor's) a genuine sacrifice, more striking because less justified internally, that is, at the narrative level. His is a sacrifice, after all, at the altar of the Story of the *Iliad*, with the Mediator acting as officiant.

Two consequences follow from this: one procedural, one broader in scope. First, it should be clear that the richness of co-implication requires a method just as protean in order to capture it. To isolate and classify general types is useful and even necessary as a first step, but ultimately risks limiting the full range of narrative possibilities and opportunities for innovation available to poet and audience. Especially given its dependence on a text, this approach tends only to reify the types and patterns it uncovers, to bind and fix them in the room of the possibilities they happened to displace *on one occasion*. Need all Mediation be expressly cued in the text by formulaic reference to Goodwill? Must there be explicit mention every time of the traits we have isolated as peculiar to Mediators? Must someone always speak first and sit down, and then another rise to speak? Or if not to speak, to take one's hand in hospitality? Need there always be an omen or a plague, or will any crisis do, even any simple quandary over choices, to signal his appearance? Despite the high frequency of formulaic echo guiding much of this study—the patterns of colonic match, phrase-count, and specific response—is Mediation after all less an object susceptible to quantification than (to borrow M. Nagler's term) a kind of loose Gestalt?[16] And if so, how avoid the risk of overlooking the particulars in favor of reconstituted universal types, thus sacrificing narrative to myth, spontaneity to some monolithic Tradition?[17]

However these questions are answered, and in whatever spirit this risk is run, tradition (however broadly or narrowly conceived) indeed remains the central issue. The community's living tradition, after all, is the

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[16] See Nagler 1974. Nagler uses the term initially to refer to the "open-endedness" of "formula systems" or "families" of formulas in Homer, and comments (13): "I would propose that this open-endedness is not merely a descriptive device, that the family is in fact open-ended because the abstract template that generates its members is not limited in its production of particular phrases but can be realized in more or less similar forms in an endless variety of contexts . . .. [T]here does not seem to be a more accurate term for such an entity than 'Gestalt'." The term soon undergoes further expansion to include "patterns and paraphrasable meanings" (17) at the level of generic scene and story. See also 34-45, 86, 201.

[17] This is a danger to which Frame 1978 and Nagy 1979, for instance, seem often to have succumbed.

implicit whole comprising the very possibility of the story (or stories) with which the isolated parts of the narrative contract their relation and from which they take their bearings, so to speak.[18] It clearly supplies the key for their understanding at the same time as it depends on these parts, on the story that guides them, and on the values these stories embody, for its own confirmation and renewal. Viewed in these terms, the question remains how most successfully to reach story through narrative, and tradition itself through the permutations of stories—and how to let that tradition somehow reach and quicken us too. What kinds of Mediation best suit this task?

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[18] The relations among oral narrative, story, and tradition—along with their implications for an oral poetics—are the subject of Foley 1991, especially chapters 1-2. I am grateful to the author for an advance copy of relevant sections of this book, as well as for patient and extensive discussion of its theses.

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